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Abstract— The regulatory framework for growing 
GM crops in Germany comprises quite liberal ex-ante 
regulations with very strict ex-post liability rules to pro-
tect other production forms from possible negative side 
effects of transgenic plants. Regulation is assumed to 
impose additional costs on farmers who intend to plant 
Bt-maize. This paper investigates the significance of 
these costs and the possibility of minimizing them by 
farm-level strategies such as coordination and coopera-
tion between the Bt-maize growing farmer and his 
neighbours. A case study investigating the behaviour of 
Bt-maize growing farmers was carried out in the Oder-
bruch region in the federal state of Brandenburg, Ger-
many. This region is leading in Bt-maize cultivation in 
Germany and has a high incidence of the European 
Corn Borer (Ostrinia nubilalis Hübner). The interviews 
revealed that additional costs due to ex-ante regulation 
and ex-post liability were only of minor importance to 
the Bt-maize growing farmers. All farms were large-
scale and could easily manage the construction of buffer 
zones within their own fields and deliberately avoided 
the planting of Bt-maize close to their neighbours. Thus 
advanced inter-farm coordination and cooperation was 
not necessary to achieve coexistence. However, the fact 
that Bt-maize was only grown on large-scale farms indi-
cates a significant threshold effect due to the regulatory 
framework in Germany likely to prevent small-scale 
farms from planting Bt-maize unless innovative farm-
level strategies of coexistence will be developed. 
Keywords— coexistence, ex-ante regulation and ex-
post liability, Germany 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In 2003, the European Commission published 
guidelines for coexistence of transgenic and non-
transgenic plants (CEC 2003a). No form of agriculture 
should be excluded in the EU, which means that farm-
ers are free to choose between farming conventionally 
or organically as well as to use genetically modified 
(GM) crops. Similarly, consumers must be given the 
opportunity to decide freely on buying the produce 
from either of these agricultural production systems. 
The realisation of coexistence follows the principle 
of subsidiarity. This means that every EU Member 
State can design and implement national regulations to 
guarantee coexistence.  
Germany incorporated rules of ex-ante regulation 
such as Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) and a pub-
lic site register and ex-post liability rules into the 
German Genetic Engineering Act (GenTG) in 2004 
but has not (yet) developed a particular law for coexis-
tence of transgenic and non-transgenic plants like for 
instance the Netherlands and Denmark. In fact, the 
German Genetic Engineering Act (GenTG) still lacks 
defined distance requirements to avoid gene outcross-
ing by pollen movement and liability rules (GentTG 
2006). An amendment is under way and is expected to 
be debated in the German parliament and federal 
council in 2008. 
By now, Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis)-maize is the 
only transgenic plant approved for commercial growth 
in the EU. Bt-maize expresses a toxin derived from the 
soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis which targets the 
larvae of the European corn borer (ECB, Ostrinia nu-
bilalis HÜBNER) when feeding on the plant. Since the 
end of 2005, five transgenic varieties of Bt-maize 
MON810 have been approved for commercial cultiva-
tion in Germany and were planted on 950 ha through-
out Germany and 443 ha in the federal state of Bran-
denburg (BVL 2007a) in 2006. The main focus of Bt-
maize cultivation in Brandenburg lay in the Oderbruch 
region close to the Polish border where infestation 
rates with the ECB are high (Schroeder, Goetzke and 
Kuntzke 2006). In 2007, commercial cultivation in-
creased up to 2,690 ha at the national level, and 1,344 
ha still cultivated in Brandenburg. Also in 2008 a gen-
eral increase can be noted with 1,720 ha in Branden-
burg and 3,714 ha nationally (BVL 2007a).   2 
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Increasing cultivation of transgenic plants raises the 
question of coexistence of agricultural production sys-
tems. Pollen movement and gene outcrossing can 
cause economic damage to conventional and organic 
farmers if the produce is subjected to labelling and, 
thus, selling is restricted or the product yields a lower 
market price. The labelling threshold for adventitious 
and unavoidable presence of GM traces has been set at 
0.9% for food and feed throughout the EU (CEC 2003b). 
According to the polluter-pays-principle, GM farm-
ers have to carry the (additional) costs of ex-ante regu-
lations and ex-post liability which emerge from the 
GenTG. This includes field registration in a national 
cadastre, compliance with security measures, and li-
ability in case of damage (GenTG 2006). 
In this paper, we first aim at identifying and assess-
ing the additional costs for the GM farmer which arise 
from ex-ante regulations and ex-post liability rules 
defined by the legal framework in Germany. Secondly 
we address the question whether these costs could be 
reduced by farmers’ coordination and cooperation. 
The empirical analysis is based on case study inter-
views with eight Bt-maize growing farmers and six of 
their adjacent neighbours in the federal state of Bran-
denburg where coexistence between GM and non-GM 
farms can already be observed. 
In the subsequent Section II, we give a short intro-
duction to the legal background of GM cultivation in 
Germany and potential costs of ex-ante regulation and 
ex-post liability. Here, we also describe the role of 
cooperation and coordination for cost reduction. Sec-
tion III gives a short overview on the case study car-
ried out in the Oderbruch region on Brandenburg in 
2006. In Section IV, we discuss the results from the 
empirical analysis, and we finish with some conclu-
sions in Section V. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND, COSTS OF EX-ANTE 
REGULATION AND EX-POST LIABILITY 
AND THE ROLE OF COOPERATION 
A.  Legal background of Bt-maize cultivation in Ger-
many 
Regulations concerning the cultivation of GM crops 
are embedded in the German Genetic Engineering Act 
(GenTG) which dates back to 1990. In 2004, the Act 
underwent its first partial amendment under the former 
red-green coalition (SPD, die Grüne) to include the 
establishment of a public site register (§16a, GenTG) 
and the compliance with Good Agricultural Practice 
(§16b, GenTG) as forms of ex-ante regulation. Fur-
thermore, ex-post liability rules were defined in §36a, 
GenTG. However, no distance requirements were 
given in this Act to keep gene outcrossing below the 
EU-wide labelling threshold for adventitious and tech-
nically unavoidable GM traces of 0.9%. The German 
Genetic Engineering Act had to undergo another 
amendment which was necessary to finally implement 
the EU Directive 2001/18/EG (CEC 2001) on deliber-
ate release of genetically modified organisms (GMO) 
into the environment. This finally took place under the 
new coalition (SPD and CDU) in 2006 after the Ger-
man Federal Council refused consent in 2005.  
The public site register is provided by the Federal 
Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety 
(BVL) which is the supreme authority responsible for 
the field of genetic engineering in Germany. The reg-
ister gives detailed information on the planting of GM 
crops in order to monitor possible environmental and 
health effects (Vaasen, Gathmann and Bartsch 2006) 
and is divided into a public part, which is freely acces-
sible over the internet, and a non-public part. The pub-
lic part contains information on field location and type 
of the GM crop. The non-public part comprises per-
sonal data of the GM farmer. For reasons of data pri-
vacy, information from this part is only given upon 
request and only to neighbouring farmers or other per-
sons with legitimate interests. Cultivation of GM crops 
must be registered 90 days in advance to planting 
(§16a GenTG). 
Another element is the compliance with the general 
code of GAP (§16b GenTG). The GM  farmer is 
obliged to meet general safety arrangements, for in-
stance minimum distances to neighbouring fields, the 
use of different varieties, or pollen barriers to prevent 
damage to third parties. However, the GenTG lacks 
concrete specification of minimum distance require-
ments that are sufficient to keep outcrossing below the 
EU-wide labelling threshold of 0.9% for adventitious 
and technical inevitable GM traces in food and feed. 
In 2006, German GM farmers had to rely on recom-
mendations from GM seed companies which recom-
mended buffer zones of 20 m to keep outcrossing be-
low the labelling threshold (Weber et al. 2006).   3 
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In the case of ex-post liability, Bt-maize growing 
farmers in a region are jointly and severally liable for 
damages caused by, e.g., gene outcrossing to 
neighbouring maize plants (§32 GenTG). Furthermore, 
GM farmers are strictly liable, i.e., even if they have 
met all requirements of the GAP, they are not exempt 
from third party liability claims. 
B. Costs arising from ex ante regulations and ex post 
liability 
The legal framework of ex-ante regulations and ex-
post liability can cause additional costs to the farmer 
who decides to grow GM crops. These costs can be 
classified as follows: 
1.  Administration and publication costs 
2.  Damage prevention and coexistence measure costs 
3.  Damage and liability costs 
Administration and publication costs: The cultiva-
tion of Bt-maize must be announced in the national 
public site register of the BVL. This can cause direct 
as well as indirect costs: 
•  The act of registration itself is closely connected 
with additional work and expense for the GM far-
mer. 
•  Free data availability through the internet: Certain 
data from the public site register is easily accessi-
ble via the internet, such as the exact location of 
the GM field. In the past, this has favoured field 
destructions by fierce opponents of the GM tech-
nology.  
Damage prevention costs: In order to avoid possible 
damage, e.g., through gene outcrossing, the farmer is 
obliged to meet the standards of GAP. 
Apart from the direct costs due to distance require-
ments, also indirect information costs have to be taken 
into account: 
•  Searching for information concerning coexistence 
measures: Since the GentTG does not provide rec-
ommendations on reasonable distance require-
ments the GM farmer him/herself has to gather in-
formation about adequate measures to avoid dam-
age. 
•  Establishment of safety measures: Measures have 
to be implemented on the farm level. Theoretical-
ly, the farmer can choose from a set of measures, 
which are able to ensure the labelling threshold of 
0.9% on neighbouring fields. 
Damage and liability costs: Even if a farmer meets 
the requirements of the code of GAP s/he is still 
jointly and severally as well as strictly liable for possi-
ble damages. The damage and liability costs depend 
on a) the expected damage, b) the probability of dam-
age occurrence, and c) the probability that the farmer 
is actually held liable for the damage. Apart from the-
ses direct costs, also possible costs arising from law-
suits have to be taken into consideration (Beckmann 
and Wesseler 2007). 
•  The magnitude of the damage and liability costs is 
influenced by 1) the price difference between GM, 
conventional, and organic products, b) the quantity 
of products affected, and c) the labelling threshold. 
•  The probability of damage occurrence is strongly 
influenced by the security measures and the type 
of GM crop grown. 
•  The probability that the farmer is held liable de-
pends on the neighbourhood relationships and the 
possibility/likelihood of amicable agreement. 
C. Coexistence measures on the farm level 
According to 2003/556/EC, coexistence refers to 
the ability of farmers to make a practical choice be-
tween conventional, organic and GM-crop production, 
in compliance with the legal obligations for labelling 
and/or purity standards. Since maize is an anemophi-
lous species, pollen movement from transgenic maize 
can take place over short distances and bear the possi-
bility of subsequent gene outcrossing to convention-
ally or organically grown maize plants. Furthermore, 
admixture of GM harvest with conventional harvest 
can occur on the farm level but will not be analysed in 
this article. Messean et al. (2006), provide a set of 
on-farm measures to reduce the above mentioned risks 
and to guarantee coexistence: 
1.  Isolation distances between GM and non GM field 
of the same species (different crop) 
2.  Use of GM and non-GM crops with different flow-
ering times (time isolation)   4 
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3.  Installation of non-GM buffer zones of the same 
crop around the GM field 
It has to be kept in mind that these coexistence 
measures are also a source of additional costs. In 
Germany, the legal framework imposes these costs on 
the GM farmer exclusively. Messean et al. (2006) re-
view some additional on-farm costs arising from indi-
vidual coexistence measures. For instance, the sowing 
of different varieties for time isolation results in nota-
ble additional costs ranging from 46 €/ha to 201 €/ha 
which can be explained by significant variety-based 
yield reduction. Additional costs of buffer zones vary 
from 60.54 to 78.07 €/ha depending on the size of the 
GM field, the width of the buffer zone, and the adop-
tion rate of GM crops in the region. Messean et al. 
(2006) denote that the smaller the GM fields (<1 ha) 
the higher are the on-farm costs caused by the estab-
lishment of buffer zones. Furthermore, also strict ex-
post liability rules can bear significant costs for small 
farms (Soregaroli and Wesseler, 2005). Economic 
losses due to coexistence measures can be minimized 
by clustering GM fields and by the establishment of 
non-GM buffer zones around whole clusters only. Yet, 
the economic analysis of Messean et al. (2006) does 
not take into account additional administrative costs or 
costs of cooperation to achieve these measures. 
D. Forms of coordination and cooperation 
According to the legal framework in Germany the 
GM-farmer carries the burden of ensuring coexistence 
exclusively. However, we argue that both the GM-
farmer and his non-GM neighbours could contribute to 
coexistence by coordination or cooperation. Coordina-
tion can take place within a single farm (intra-farm 
coordination) or among two adjacent farmers (inter-
farm coordination). For intra-farm coordination, a 
GM-farmer can arrange his own fields to keep maxi-
mum distances to his neighbours, adjust field size to 
reduce the risk of gene outcrossing and the costs of 
additional buffer zones or install isolation distances. 
Inter-farm coordination involves the GM-farmer as 
well as the non-GM neighbour. The GM-farmer can 
inform his neighbour on the exact location of the GM-
field. This information can also be obtained by the 
public site register. Both farmers can agree on planting 
different varieties or adjusting their cultivation plans 
in order to prevent short distances between GM- and 
non-GM maize fields. 
Cooperation itself can be defined as a special form 
of inter-farm coordination. Beckmann and Schleyer 
(2007) observe three new forms agricultural coopera-
tion as a result of the approval of transgenic varieties 
for commercial cultivation in the EU: (1) the devel-
opment of so-called GMO free zones, (2) the creation 
of potential GMO-zones or (3) cooperation for coexis-
tence.  
Data on the development of GMO-free zones in 
Germany indicate that the most common form of ex-
plicit cooperation to cope with agro-biotechnology is 
avoidance where adjoining farms sign contracts to re-
frain from growing or feeding GM crops.  
We assume, that in the special case of Bt-maize it is 
very easy to join a GMO-free zone if a) little or no 
maize at all is grown in the region, b) the ECB is of 
minor importance or can be controlled easily by other 
means than Bt, or c) the region is characterised by a 
high density of organic farms which are not permitted 
to make use of the GM technology. Furtan et al. 
(2007) reported positive welfare effects through the 
formation of an organic club (a GMO-free zone). 
Alternatively, neighbouring farmers could cooper-
ate to form a GMO-zone, where only GM crops are 
grown. This is the case if at least two adjacent farmers 
rank the value of GM-production higher than the value 
of non-GM production. 
In the case of cooperation for coexistence, one 
farmer attaches a higher benefit to the non-GM pro-
duction whereas her/his neighbour ranks the value of 
GM-production higher. Especially in areas with small-
structured agricultural production, adjacent farmers 
can cooperate for coexistence by changing fields to 
keep safe distances.  
In a region with GM farms as well as conventional 
or organic farms coexistence can cause additional 
costs. We argue that cooperation between neighbour-
ing farmers becomes the more beneficial the higher 
the costs of on-farm coexistence measures are per-
ceived and if cooperation can reduce the costs of ex-
ante regulation and ex-post liability significantly. One 
still has to keep in mind that also coordination and 
cooperation themselves are a new source of additional 
costs since agreements have to be made, monitored, 
and enforced.    5 
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Further, cooperation can not only be observed 
among farmers but also between farmers and down-
stream enterprises, such as seed companies. In 2005, 
the seed and grain trading company Märkische Kraft-
futter GmbH (Märka) implemented a practical quality 
assurance system. Together with Monsanto and Pio-
neer the company allowed GM grain maize to be 
commercialized while at the same time it guaranteed 
farmers that their conventional grain maize grown ad-
jacent to Bt-maize was being bought regardless of 
possible GMO traces and without any price reduction 
as long as the labelling threshold was not exceeded 
(Pohl et al., 2005; Weber et al. 2006). GM farmers 
participating in this project, voluntarily implemented 
GAP to keep GMO traces below the labelling thresh-
old. In turn, the trader was responsible for further seg-
regation and labelling. By defining a 20 m separation 
distance for secure compliance with the 0.9% thresh-
old, the Märka system relied on the outcomes of sev-
eral studies on pollen movement and cross-pollination. 
Additionally, the GM farmer was asked to inform ad-
jacent neighbours within a 100 m range from the Bt-
maize field and to harvest, store and transport GM-
maize and non-GM-maize separately as well as to 
clean machinery adequately (Pohl et al., 2005). 
III. A CASE STUDY OF BT-MAIZE CULTIVA-
TION IN BRANDENBURG – GERMANY 
A. The case study region  
As a case study region, the administrative district 
Märkisch-Oderland in German federal state of Bran-
denburg has been selected. Within this region, the 
Oderbruch region is located, which shows an increas-
ing incidence of the ECB (European Corn Borer; Os-
trinia nubilais HÜBNER) since its first report in 1986 
(Schroeder, Goetzke and Kuntzke 2006). Especially in 
grain maize production the ECB can cause yearly on-
farm losses up to 30% (Piprek 2005). The insect can 
be controlled by a set of measures, including tilling 
operations, chemical and biological pest control, and – 
since 2006 – the cultivation of Bt-maize. These meas-
ures, however, differ significantly in their effective-
ness. Although tilling is reported to be powerful 
against the ECB, it can not be recommended for many 
parts of the Oderbruch region because of soil charac-
teristics. Chemical control has an efficiency factor of 
70 to 90 % but is also connected with two major dis-
advantages: Firstly, in 2006 only one pesticide is ap-
proved for the chemical control of the ECB in maize 
in Germany (BVL 2007b) which deprives the farmer 
of useful alternatives, e.g. for resistance management. 
Secondly, control is technically difficult because at the 
time of spraying the maize plants have already reached 
a height of 1.5  m and special machinery is needed. 
Furthermore, the farmer has to adhere to a narrow time 
frame for insecticide application since as soon as the 
ECB larvae have once entered the maize stem, surface 
spraying is no longer useful. 
Biological control with the natural antagonist 
Trichogramma brassicae is reported to be less effec-
tive than chemical control in the Oderbruch region and 
application is time and cost-intensive. Government aid 
is given for Trichogramma-control in some parts of 
Germany, but this does not apply to Brandenburg 
(Winkler 2005). 
Bt-maize MON810 which is the only GM crop ap-
proved for commercial production in Germany con-
tains a δ-endotoxin of the soil bacterium Bacillus thur-
ingiensis which is lethal to the larvae of lepidopteran 
species, such as the ECB. The efficiency factor is re-
ported to be nearly 100% (Degenhardt, Horstmann and 
Mülleder 2006). Since its first approval for field trials 
in 1998, Bt-maize MON 810 has been tested on-farm 
in Brandenburg. Some of the farmers who engaged in 
former field trails switched to commercial Bt-maize 
cultivation in 2006. 
B. Sample selection and farm characteristics 
From the public site register, eight Bt-maize grow-
ing farmers could be identified in the rural district of 
Märkisch-Oderland in 2006. All of them were inter-
viewed using a standardised questionnaire which 
comprised questions regarding on-farm Bt-maize cul-
tivation and the perception of ex-ante regulation and 
ex-post liability rules. Some of the Bt-maize growing 
farmers passed on the names of their adjacent 
neighbours who could be interviewed subsequently. 
Since maize pollen can spread over short distances, the 
GM farmers were asked to provide information on 
those of their adjacent neighbours who were also 
growing maize. It was of major interest whether adja-
cent farmers were informed about the Bt-maize culti-
vation or if any coordination or even cooperation took   6 
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place to avoid outcrossing. Furthermore, we asked if 
the farmers were (still) on friendly terms with their 
neighbours, or if the relationship had changed due to 
Bt-maize cultivation. 
Since it was assumed that the seed and grain trading 
company Märka contributed to cooperation it was also 
examined if both, the GM farmers and the neighbour-
ing farmers knew about or made use of the purchase 
guarantee for adjacent maize. 
The data collected from the GM farmers was veri-
fied by the respective statements of the six neighbours. 
We chose the case study approach for data collec-
tion and analysis because only very few farmers were 
growing Bt-maize in the region. Quantitative data on 
Bt-maize cultivation was also collected but statistical 
evaluation was not possible because of the small sam-
ple size. Results obtained from each farm regarding 
coordination and cooperation as well as neighbour re-
lationships will be described subsequently (please also 
refer to Table 1): 
 
Farm 1: 
Farmer 1 had five neighbours, two of them being 
organic farms and the rest conventional. The organic 
farms were not growing maize at all. One of the con-
ventional farmers also showed interest in growing Bt-
maize but up to now, he refrained from doing so be-
cause of the public site register. In case of an increase 
in ECB infestation, however, he would reconsider his 
decision. Adjacent neighbours had been informed in 
time about the planting of Bt-maize and field location. 
The relationship to large (conventional) farmers was 
described as “good” and to one of the organic farmers 
as “difficult”. The latter one showed strong resentment 
about the adoption of GM crops. Farmer 1 tried to 
avoid unnecessary provocation by not planting 
Bt-maize close to the fields of the organic farm. How-
ever, the relationship did not change due to growing 
GM. Cooperation for coexistence could not be ob-
served. Farmer 1 knew about the Märka system and 
but none of the adjacent farmers not he himself had to 
make use of it since sufficient safety distance were 
kept. 
Farm 2: 
Farmer 2 adopted Bt-maize cultivation in 2006 on 
an area of 17 ha, 15 ha being the actual Bt-maize plot 
size and 2 ha buffer zone around the field. The field 
was situated close to a neighbouring field where no 
maize was grown. This resulted in inter-farm coordi-
nation since the GM farmer notified his adjacent 
neighbour about planting Bt-maize close to his fields. 
Intra-farm coordination took thus place by means of 
keeping recommended distance requirements by in-
stalling a 25 m buffer zone around the Bt-maize plot. 
Farm 2 stated to have informed the adjacent farmer 
prior to Bt-maize plantation. Coordination for coexis-
tence did not take place. Neither of the two neighbours 
saw any need for coordinating planting areas or time 
since they did not expect any damage. No information 
was exchanged about possible damages and liability 
issues. The relationship was described as “good” and 
did not change because of Bt-maize cultivation. 
Farm 3: 
Farmer 3 started to grow Bt-maize on a very small 
area for trial in 2006. The farm had six neighbours, 
one of them being an organic farm, which did not 
grow maize at all. Three neighbours were large farms, 
also growing maize. These farms showed much inter-
est in the trial carried out at Farm 3 and also took into 
consideration to partly switch to Bt-maize in the fol-
lowing years. All neighbours had been informed about 
Bt-maize cultivation in advance. Cooperation for co-
existence was not reported. The relationship between 
the GM-farmer and the neighbours was described as 
“good”, but changed to the worse with the organic 
farm.  
Farm 4: 
Farmer 4 had 10 neighbours, most of them growing 
conventional maize, only one producing organically. 
Some of the adjacent conventional farmers also con-
sidered Bt-maize cultivation. These neighbours had 
been informed when it was regarded as reasonable. No 
cooperation for coexistence could be observed. The 
relationship was reported as “good” and did not 
change over time. Farmer 4 informed his neighbours 
about the Märka system, but no one made use of it. 
   7 
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Table 1 Comparison of Bt-maize growing farms and adjacent non-GM farms 
 
  Farm 1  Farm 2  Farm 3  Farm 4 Farm 5  Farm 6 Farm 7  Farm 8 
Farm Size (area under pro-
duction - AUP in ha)  530  650  2 200  1 350  1 700  1.080  3 000  505 
Maize area 
in ha  110 130  263  246  400  120  500  250 
% Bt of 




















tion in 2006 
% Bt of 
maize area  27.3 11.5 1.7  20.3  14.5  20.8  8.0 6.0 
Number of adjacent farms  5 2  6  10  5  6  6  6 
Production type of adjacent 
farms*  3 C, 2 O  2 C  5 C, 1 O  9 C, 1 
O  5 C  4 C, 2 
O  4 C, 2 O  6 C 
Acceptance of Bt in adjacent 
farms 
Good, except 
organic farm  Not known  Good  Good  Good  Good  Good  Good 
Relationship to neighbours  Good, except 
organic farm 
Good to very 
good  Good Good  Good except 
one farm  Good  Very good to very 




















Change of relationship due 
to Bt cultivation  No No  Only to organic 
farm   No No No  No  No 
Field allocation**  1  3  1  1 and 3 1 and 3  2 and 5 2 and 4  1 
Buffer zone/Isolation dis-
tance  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Information about intended 
Bt cultivation  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 








































Cooperation  No No  No  No  No  No  No  No 
* C: conventional; O: organic  ** 1) Within own maize fields; 2) Bordering non-maize field (own); 3) Bordering non-maize field (foreign); 4) Bordering 
maize field (own), 5) Bordering maize field (foreign) 
   8 
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Farm 5: 
Farmer 5 had 5 neighbours and stated to have in-
formed all of them on intended Bt-maize cultivation. 
He had contacted his neighbours personally if cultiva-
tion was planned in direct neighbourhood to adjacent 
maize stands. Two neighbours had not been informed 
directly because of the great distance of several kilo-
metres between the GM field and their conventional 
maize stands. Cooperation for coexistence was not 
regarded necessary and no information about potential 
damages was exchanged. The Märka system was well 
known but not used. The GM-farmer described the 
relationship to his neighbours as “good”, and this de-
scription was confirmed by the neighbours. 
Farm 6: 
Farmer 6 had six neighbours in total, four of them 
farming conventionally and two organically. Three 
neighbours were growing maize. Farmer 6 did not 
grow Bt-maize close to the organic farms to avoid 
confrontation. In cases where fields adjoined the GM 
farmer claimed that he had informed all of his 
neighbours orally. One neighbour stated that he had 
not been informed, but traced this back to the huge 
distance between the GM field and his own (2 km). 
One neighbour was situated between the fields of two 
GM farms (Farm 6 and 7) and had not been informed 
either. However, the fields did not directly adjoin. Co-
operation did not take place and no information about 
damage or liability has been exchanged. Farmer 6 
knew about the Märka system, but the neighbours did 
not. The relationship was described as “normal” and 
did not change. 
Farm 7: 
Farmer 7 had six to seven neighbours, two of them 
organic farms. Only one farm was growing conven-
tional maize at all. This neighbour was interested in 
also switching to Bt-maize, but was afraid of his milk 
being refused by the dairies and he himself becoming 
a target for anti-GM activists. Farmer 7 had not in-
formed his neighbours because they seemed not to 
care about Bt-maize cultivation and therefore, coop-
eration could be not observed. The relationship ranged 
from “very good” to “very bad”, but not due to GM. 
The Märka system was known, but not made use of. 
Farm 8: 
Farmer 8 had six neighbours, none of them farming 
organically. Four adjacent farmers were growing con-
ventional maize. One of the neighbours was also a GM 
farmer, Farmer 7 but a clustering of GM fields was not 
taken into consideration. The neighbours had been 
informed orally. Cooperation was not regarded neces-
sary and, thus, did not take place. The relationship to 
all neighbouring farmers was described as “good”. 
Farmer 8 was acquainted with the Märka system but 
did not use it. 
As can be seen from the interviews with the eight 
Bt-maize growing farmers in the Oderbruch region, 
coordination in terms of informing adjacent 
neighbours was a common practice although not pre-
scribed under the German legislation in 2006. Also 
necessary distance requirements or buffer zones of 
conventional maize were kept around the Bt-maize 
stands. Many Bt-maize growing farmers even re-
frained from growing GM maize close to organic 
fields, even if these farmers did not grow any maize at 
all. Specific cooperation for coexistence, however, 
was not observed in any case. 
Section 4 will now focus in detail on the assessment 
of costs for coexistence and the individual on-farm 
strategies to achieve this goal.  
IV. COST ESTIMATION UND STRATEGIES FOR 
COEXISTENCE 
After this short characterisation of the interviewed 
farmers, we now provide an assessment of ex-ante 
regulation and ex-post liability costs. 
A. Administration and publication costs due to public 
site register 
In the first place, a registration in the public site 
register is an additional time-consuming activity. At 
least three months in advance, the farmer has to decide 
where to plant Bt-maize and the other crops. Once reg-
istered, he can only plant Bt-maize on the areas he ini-
tially intended for this purpose and could be forced to 
change his cultivation plan if an adjacent farmer de-
cided also to plant maize close to his Bt-maize field. 
The interview results reflect these additional costs 
since half of the Bt-maize growing farmers regarded 
the registration as “cost-intensive”. Registration is also 
accompanied by the publication of farm-related and   9 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
personal data which can be obtained upon request. 
Seven out of eight farmers reported personal disadvan-
tages because of this publication. Five GM farmers 
became a direct target of anti-GM campaigns, such as 
field destructions and other hostilities. There is no 
doubt that anti-GM groups have a clear interest in ob-
taining personal data of the GM farmers to exert pres-
sure directly. For instance, the “Bantam” Initiative 
(Anonymus 2007) which is supported by Greenpeace, 
the German Society for Nature Conservation (NABU), 
several church groups, and stakeholders of the organic 
movement aims at obtaining insight into the non-
public part of the public site register by planting old 
varieties of sweet maize close to GM maize stands just 
to become legitimised to get personal data of the GM 
farmers in the region. 
B. Damage prevention, coexistence measures and 
their costs 
For the planting seasons 2006 and 2007, the GenTG 
(dated 17th March 2006) did not contain concrete 
measures for coexistence with respect to GAP and 
only seed companies provided recommendations on 
coexistence management, such as distance require-
ments or for the cleaning of machinery. Every GM 
farmer kept at least a 20 m buffer zone of non-GM 
maize around the Bt-maize stands as suggested by 
Monsanto Agrar Deutschland GmbH. The majority of 
the farmers were even willing to keep buffer zones up 
to 100 m and beyond. Interestingly enough, seven out 
of eight GM farmers linked no or only negligible costs 
to the establishment of buffer zones. Only one farmer 
described the additional costs as high. The reason can 
be found in the farm structure. The smallest GM farm 
had an area of 500 ha, the largest comprised 3,000 ha. 
The adjacent farms were even larger with an area up to 
7,000 ha. In relation to the total area under cultivation, 
the percentage of Bt-maize never exceeded 6%. This 
indicates that Bt-maize cultivation is still confined to 
rather small areas and can, thus, be coordinated easily 
within the farm. Prevalently, we observed the cultiva-
tion of Bt-maize in the midst of conventional maize 
stands of the same farm which served as buffer zones. 
Further, since most of the maize was grown for intra-
farm cattle feeding, a strict segregation of GM and 
non-GM harvest was not necessary on the farm level. 
All farmers were very well informed about the dis-
tance requirements and kept buffer zones. Since most 
of the farmers already carried out field studies with 
GM-maize, we assume that gaining information on 
safety measures was not linked to high costs. 
C. Evaluation of liability rules and risk of damage 
The ex-post liability rules did not have any promi-
nent influence on the decision to grow Bt-maize. The 
GM farmers were able to reduce the risk of gene out-
crossing and, thus, economic damage to their 
neighbours by spatial allocation of the Bt-maize fields. 
Most of the GM farmers planned to increase Bt-maize 
cultivation in the next years regardless of a change of 
the liability rules. On the contrary, three of the six 
neighbours stated not to have grown Bt-maize due to 
the remaining uncertainty as to the liability in case of 
damage. According to Beckmann and Wesseler 
(2007), damage may occur if the adjacent conven-
tional maize exceeds a pre-defined threshold level for 
adventitious or technically unavoidable GM traces and 
yields a lower market price due to labelling. In re-
verse, damage would not occur if the threshold was 
not exceeded or if GM products were marketed at the 
same price as non-GM products. The farms we ana-
lysed were mainly growing maize for silage which 
was not intended for sale. No damage is expected if 
silo maize with an adventitious presence beyond 0.9% 
is fed to livestock, since neither meet nor milk or eggs 
must be labelled according to EU legislation. Thus, 
damage can only occur in case of market sale, if the 
product has to be labelled and yields a lower price. In 
Brandenburg, GM grain maize could be sold without 
any problem in 2006. The same holds true for conven-
tional grain maize exceeding the labelling threshold. 
Against all expectations, both conventional grain 
maize and GM grain maize of comparable quality 
yielded 120€/t when sold to Märka in 2006. We con-
clude that even in the case of GM traces beyond the 
threshold no economic damage could occur. However, 
this only applies to the farms we considered within our 
case studies and should not be generalised. It has to be 
stated that in 2006 none of the GM-farmers faced any 
damage or liability costs. This can be due to several 
reasons: first, all farmers kept distance requirements 
which were reported to be sufficient to keep outcross-
ing below the threshold level. Second, even in case of   10 
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market sale, the threshold would have played a negli-
gible role since for grain maize the Märka system en-
sured no economic damage. 
However, possible damages for organic farms were 
not considered and have to be analysed separately. 
This was not attempted in this study since legally fixed 
threshold levels for adventitious presence of GM 
traces in organic maize are still missing in Germany. 
D. Coordination and cooperation between neighbours 
As we already pointed out, neighbouring farmers 
have incentives to coordinate if this reduces the costs 
of coexistence. Different forms of coordination for 
coexistence are possible, ranging from relatively easy 
inter-farm coordination where no external actors are 
involved to inter-farm coordination and cooperation 
where the GM-farmer closely interacts with his 
neighbours or downstream enterprises such as Märka. 
According to our definition, intra-farm coordination 
consists of three general components: 1) field alloca-
tion, 2) field size and 3) isolation distances. Regarding 
the first two measures the GM farmer can decide 
freely on whether to adopt them or not whereas the 
last option is already prescribed by law even if legally 
defined safety distances are still lacking. In our case 
study we observed that all farmers willingly kept dis-
tance requirements mainly in the form of buffer zones. 
In some cases, farmers also made use of field alloca-
tion to ensure even wider safety distances to organi-
cally farming neighbours. 
Inter-farm coordination always directly involves the 
adjacent farmers. We define four components of inter-
farm coordination: 1) information of neighbours, 2) 
adjustment of cultivation plans, 3) use of different 
(maize) varieties and finally 4) cooperation. Coopera-
tion itself can be divided into three subgroups as sug-
gested by Beckmann and Schleyer (2007): Coopera-
tion can take place either in the form of a GMO-free 
zone, a GMO-zone or cooperation for coexistence as 
for instance the exchange of plots to ensure safety re-
quirements. 
In most cases, the GM-farmer informed at least di-
rectly affected neighbours about his intention to plant 
Bt-maize and about the location of the field. This took 
place on a semi-official basis since the actual GenTG 
did not require notification of neighbours at that time. 
However, notification was part of the Märka system in 
Brandenburg. In our case study we did neither observe 
the adjustment of cultivation plans nor the use of dif-
ferent varieties. We argue that inter-farm coordination 
is not generally necessary for the adjustment of culti-
vation plans. In northern Germany, maize can not be 
drilled until late spring because of the soil tempera-
ture. At that time, winter grain (wheat, barley, rye, and 
rape seed) has already germinated. At the time when 
the GM farmer has to make his registration in the ca-
dastre he already notices which crop has been sown 
next to his Bt-maize stand. Thus, he can coordinate his 
planting without contacting his neighbours. 
The adjustment of varieties seems to be only a theo-
retical solution for coexistence. First of all, it is ac-
companied with additional costs, ranging from 46 to 
201 €/ha according to Messean et al. (2006). In Ger-
many, only five different varieties of MON810 are 
approved for commercial cultivation. Two of them are 
medium early varieties (DKC 3421 YG and 
PR  39V17) and three are late maturing varieties 
(Kuratus, PR 38F71 and PR 39F56) (Bundessortenamt 
2007). From this, we conclude that a GM farmer can 
only vary the flowering time within these two groups 
since no early maturing varieties are yet available on 
the market. This provides little scope for inter-farm 
coordination. Otherwise, the non-GM neighbour could 
make use of the different varieties of conventional 
maize and adjust his varieties for the sake of coexis-
tence. None of the farmers we interviewed seriously 
took this form of coexistence into consideration. 
The establishment of buffer zones or isolation dis-
tances can also cause additional costs to the GM 
farmer. The costs differ according to the width of the 
buffer zone and the size of the fields. The smaller the 
field the higher are the costs for the buffer zone (cf. 
Messean et al., 2006). In certain areas this can render 
cooperation for coexistence useful by changing plots 
to obtain larger fields. The average GM field size in 
our study was 36 ha and we therefore conclude that in 
our cases cooperation did not provide an incentive, 
because additional costs were not high enough. The 
results from our case study lead us to the overall con-
clusion, that under the given circumstances in Bran-
denburg, GM-farmers tend to prefer intra-farms coor-
dination rather than inter-farm coordination or even 
cooperation. This is mainly due to the large farms with   11 
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a still low percentage of GM-maize which can guaran-
tee coexistence by intra-farm field coordination.  
We also analysed how much the seed and grain 
trading company Märka contributed to coexistence in 
Brandenburg. The GM farmers as well as most of their 
neighbours were well informed about the Märka sys-
tem. However, in 2006 neither of the adjacent farms 
made use of it. It has to be stated that in 2006, Märka 
was the only grain trading company in Germany 
which also took delivery of the Bt-maize harvest in 
case of grain maize. When it comes to coexistence, the 
impact of the Märka system should not be overstated. 
As already mentioned, the system only applies to the 
production of grain maize. Most of the farms we inter-
viewed focused on the production of silo maize. Sec-
ondly, in the case of grain maize production, the adja-
cent maize must be below the labelling threshold to be 
bought by Märka. Otherwise, the maize is exempt 
from this specific regulation and has to be labelled as 
GM. However, as orally reported from Märka, there 
was no price difference between Bt grain maize and 
conventional grain maize if quality parameters were 
comparable. 
Thus, we come to the conclusion, that Märka re-
duces liability costs not because it buys unlabelled 
neighbouring grain maize but because it pays the same 
prize for GM maize as well as for conventional maize 
(120€/t in 2006). Gene outcrossing would thus not 
result in an economic damage for neighbouring con-
ventional farms. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the course of the interviews it turned out that all 
GM farms were large farms. In Brandenburg, the av-
erage farm size is 200 ha (MLUV 2006). The GM 
farms reached from 500 ha up to 3,000 ha. In contrast, 
the shares of GM maize in relation to the farm sizes 
were still very small since 2006 was the first year of 
commercial cultivation. By arranging their GM-fields, 
the GM farmers preferred intra-farm rather than inter-
farm cooperation to guarantee coexistence. Intra-farm 
coordination could be interpreted as a costs effective 
manner to comply with ex-ante regulations and ex-
post liability rules in force. Beyond this, perceived low 
additional costs of ex-ante regulation and ex-post li-
ability are the reasons why cooperation was not neces-
sary at present time. One could now assume that in-
centives for cooperation are thus more distinct in areas 
dominated by small-scale farms as for instance in the 
federal state of Bavaria (Beckmann and Schleyer 
2007). However, here hardly any Bt-maize cultivation 
takes place at all, even if maize is affected by the 
ECB. 
Still, coordination and cooperation is very likely to 
gain more importance in the future. All GM farmers 
planned to expand their GM-maize production area. In 
the long run, this probably will render intra-farm coor-
dination more expensive. However, GM maize will 
never account for 100% of the maize grown on the 
farm. Measures for resistance management prescribed 
by seed producers foresee a percentage of at least 20% 
of non GM maize (cf. KWS 2007). 
The analysis was carried out under the regulative 
framework of the GenTG from 2006. As stated above, 
the Act did neither define specific distance require-
ments in the course of Good Agricultural Practice, nor 
was there the duty to inform the non-GM neighbour 
nor could a GM farmer and his neighbour decide on 
modifying distance requirements by private agree-
ments. At the beginning of 2008, the German Genetic 
Engineering Act was again amended and the new act 
envisions detailed rules of coexistence management 
for the first time. Now, the GM farmer has to inform 
neighbouring farmers on planned GM cultivation. Fur-
thermore, GM farmers have to coordinate their plant-
ing with their neighbours. The minimum distance re-
quirement for Bt-maize are set at 150 m to conven-
tional farms and 300  m to organic farms. These re-
quirements can though be relaxed by private agree-
ment. Inter-farm coordination is therefore expected to 
gain importance in the future.  
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